any debt or d_ity; every such claim or charge remaining a lieu on the property, although not in the possession of the person’ to whom the debt or duty is due. Downer v. Brackett, 21 Vt. 002, l-‘eil. Cas. No. 4,043. And see Trust v. Pirsson, 1 Ililt. (N. Y.) 200; In re Byrne (D. C.) 07 Fed. 704; Storm v. Waddell. 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 507; Stansbury v. Patent Cloth Mfg. Co., 5 N. J. Law, 441; The Meno- ininie (D. C.) 30 Fed. 199; Mobile B. & L. Ass’n v. Robertson, 05 Ala. 382; The J. E. Iiumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 498, 37 L. Ed. 345. In the Scotch law, the doctrine of lien is known by the name of “retention,” and that of set-off by the name of “compensation.” The Roman or civil law embraces under the head of “mortgage and privilege” the peculiar securities which, in the common and maritime law and equity, are termed “liens.” Classification. Liens are either particular or general. The former is a right to retain a tiling for some charge or claim growing out of, or connected with, the identical thing. A general lien is a right to detain a chattel, etc., until payment be made, not only of any debt due in respect of the particular chattel, but of any balance that may be due on general account in the same line of business. A general lien, being against the ordinary rule of law, depends entirely upon contract, express or implied, from the special usage of dealing between the parties. Wharton. Crommelin v. Railroad Co., 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 80; McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 150, 38 Am. Dec. 291 ; Brooks v. Bryce, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 10. A spccial lien is in the nature of a particular lien, being a lien upon particular property; a lien which the holder can enforce only as security for the performance of a particular act or obligation and of obligations incidental thereto. Green v. Coast Line It. Co., 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E 814, 33 L. R. A. 800. 54 Am. St. Rep. 379; Civ. Code Cal. 1903,